Jurisdição constitucional, cortes constitucionais e o Supremo Tribunal Federal: disparidades e possíveis harmonizações principiológicas.

Abstract

Constitutional Jurisdiction presents itself as a warranty mechanism for Constitution's ideological group against changes that doesn't reflects the evolutions of that group. Such ideas retraces to ancient Greece, passing through French and America's revolutions, accomplishing its goals nowadays by Constitutional Courts actions. Theses organs have different kinds of jurisdiction, election ways and process because of its specialties. Although several countries apply it according to their local realities, there are certain minimum attributes for them to be really effectives. We question if in Brazil, the responsible organ for such jurisdiction's execution - Supreme Tribunal Federal - it is provided with these minimum attributes, being able to be called a Constitutional Court. The research will be done trough the bibliographic method and it will use the historical evolutive, comparative, juridical interpretation and quantitative methods, in a way that approaches the theme efficiently and profoundly. Going for this answer, first we defined and contextualized Constitution's and Constitutional Jurisdiction's concepts, showing historical evolution and justifying its need; after, we defined a theoretical model representing the minimal group of possible attributes to such a jurisdiction. Holding this model, we classified the most important countries for the development of the Constitutional Jurisdiction by such standards - France, USA and Austria - and then we proceed to the same classification of the national model. This was properly demonstrated from its historical context, having its current constitutional jurisdiction organ, the STF, properly analyzed and classified. We raised the problem of its execution, in a way that this organ causes the current judiciary plastering because it accumulates many functions. With this argument, we exposed the flaws of the national model, when compared to the other models and we perceived that the current model represents a merge of institutes form American an Austrian models, adding control functions from both. Herewith, we concluded that STF represents only formally a Constitutional Court, but materially it can't be framed as such, because it doesn't accomplishes effective control, for its competences accumulation. Finally, we suggested that the organ shard its ordinary competences with the STJ and restricts itself only to the control of great concentrated or diffuse questions, so as to be qualified as a real Constitutional Court.