O juiz na relação processual civil: seus poderes, deveres e responsabilidade.

Abstract

The present monograph objectified to give to know what make us the law, the doctrine and the administrative and constitutional jurisprudence of the judge, in the civil procedural relation, specifically in that concerns to its powers, duties and responsibilities. Our text demonstrates to fit to the State to tutor the rights and guarantees of its citizens. To play this role, the State was divided in three to be able: Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, between which he (the state) distributes its functions. Elaboration of the laws competes to the Legislative, to the Executive competes to executions of the laws and to the Judiciary, its concrete application of them. From the instauration of the process i f it initiates the relation between the three main citizens: the State-judge, author and male defendant. The judge is the main of the procedural relation, placing itself in a different and superior plan to the one of the parts, a time that is it who withholds to be able to lead, deed of division and materially the process, exerting the sobering function to judge. The civil procedure law confers excellent to be able to the judge, in the procedural relation, distributed in two species: jurisdictional and of policy. This i f relates to the judiciary authority, in the defense of the order of the forensic works. To be able them jurisdictional they are the used ones for the judge in the direction of the process, and if they classify in ordinatories, instructorless and ends. To the judge also few duties are taxes, not being the mains one, the power of the judgment. Integrated to this is the impartial, to treat the parts with fast urbanity, to look the conciliatory solution to any time, to judge in accordance with begin it of the legality, not to exempt himself to judge, to appeal to the equity, to decide deals it for that the part to consider, to hinder the fraud to base the sentence and to observe that begin it of the physical identity of the judge. The civil liability before third for the actual damages for acts of the judge, according to some doctrines and jurisprudences, must personally be of the judge. But a chain in the doctrine and the jurisprudence exists, to which we agree, that it defends the responsibility of the State, with regressive right, demonstrated the deceit of blames of the judge.