Direito ao esquecimento versus Direito à liberdade de expressão e informação: Um conflito constitucional.

Abstract

The general objective of this monograph is to examine the constitutional conflict between the right to be forgotten and the rights related to freedom of expression and information. In relation to specific objectives, the essay proposes to address the history of the right to be forgotten in the national legal system, while presenting the concepts and principles relating to the right to be forgotten and the rights to freedom of expression and information; Furthermore, it undertakes to evaluate the complexity of the conflict between these rights, as well as analyzing the position of Brazilian higher authorities regarding the conflict; finally, it studies the legal implications and importance of the right to be forgotten. The methodology deals with strategic basic research that adopts the deductive method, as it seeks to reach a specific conclusion, analyzing doctrine, legislation and jurisprudence. The study uses a qualitative approach. The bibliographical procedure is adopted, with the delimitation of a theoretical framework drawn from the review of published works on the topic. It is understood that the complexity involved in the conflict is related to the need to find a balance between the protection of people's privacy and dignity and the exercise of freedom of expression and access to information, since the application of the right to be forgotten requires a thorough assessment, especially when constitutional prerogatives conflict, taking into account the particularities of each situation. It appears that the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, in the judgment of the issue of general repercussion no. 786, which declared the incompatibility of the right to be forgotten with the Federal Constitution, created a problematic precedent, mainly with regard to the absence of criteria or technical parameters for its application, and the lack of adequate consideration between the rights in conflict. It is concluded that the right to be forgotten should not be confused with the possibility of censoring news, since its role is to prevent the dissemination of information devoid of social relevance and public interest, even if true, when shown to be harmful to physical or morality of an individual.