Performance eleitoral dos parlamentares e alocação de recursos nos Estados da Paraíba, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte e Alagoas.

Abstract

Parliamentary amendments are important devices in democratic systems, allowing legislators to influence the allocation of public resources and the implementation of public policies. This research analyzes the way in which parliamentarians' amendments to the Union's budget have been used and how they are important in representing regional interests and in monitoring the Executive Branch. The investigation allows us to observe what incentives federal deputies have to guide the allocation of resources to states and municipalities through parliamentary amendments. The analysis took place on the benches of federal deputies from the states of Paraíba, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte and Alagoas. The data was collected from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) database on the 2014 elections, from the Federal Senate's Siga Brasil, which provides a source of information on amendments relating to the 2016-2018 period, and from the Transparency Portal. The data presents information on individual amendments of each parliamentarian in their presentation and execution condition. The results show that parliamentary amendments to the budget are widely used by federal deputies. Regarding its direction, it is not possible to establish a pattern between resource allocation and deputy voting in a given location. There are situations in which the allocation of resources corresponds to favoring municipalities where the deputy received a more expressive vote. Despite this, it cannot be concluded that this relationship becomes the standard for parliamentary behavior. Finally, they highlight the need for a continuous debate on the reasons and motivations for the direction of parliamentary amendments.