OLIVEIRA, L. N.; http://lattes.cnpq.br/6040438672525895; OLIVEIRA, Luciano Neves de.
Résumé:
The main objective of this work is to promote an empirical analysis on campaign financing, especially business financing, bringing a comparative table between different countries with different political systems, observing if there is a link between the financing model and the corruption levels as it was. apparent in the justification of the TSE when it banned corporate finance as the source of corruption in relations between financiers, parties, candidates and the government. Always a recurring theme within the political scenario, campaign financing has been diversified in several countries with different political systems, with their own rules and limits, the target of criticism and constant regulations in
Brazil and worldwide. Electoral financing proves to be a controversial issue as it raises questions about private interests in elections and in government institutions, often associated with shady relations between the private and the public agent in cases of corruption. The action of private agents in election campaigns raises questions about their interest in the policy to be developed by the political agent, a clear action of interest groups on institutions and their regulations. In analyzing different public and private party financing systems and their institutional designs, we look at the boundaries set in different countries as a means of combating political corruption and establish comparative tables
between different political systems and their costing systems by establishing a degree of rigidity to the models. of the same. For such study, we made a bibliographic analysis on the proposed theme, as well as for a better analysis we used a Database of 180 countries and 29 variables on party financing, derived from the IDEA Database (International Institute for Democracy and Assistance 2014. The study shows that corporate finance is widely used worldwide even in countries with low corruption rates; data analysis shows that there is no correlation between the campaign finance model and corruption and that a higher degree of rigidity over electoral financing does not necessarily result in less corruption. Given these findings, the ban on the TSE proves to be inefficient because it does not take into account the political institutions, the political landscape, the political culture, the oversight system, or the legal system.