Omissão institucional e o uso dos instrumentos judiciais correspondentes na arena política

Abstract

The study of the formal empowerment of the Judiciary is relevant in Brazil. This is because, coupled with the adoption of in concrete control of laws (North American), the country also started to incorporate the Austrian model of in abstract control of normative acts, which led to several studies on the system's hybridism. It is also noticeable in the literature that research on the performance of the Judiciary in Brazil tends to focus on the study of the use of constitutionality control instruments whose object is to challenge a given policy. However, it ignores those instruments that aim to attack an omissive (desertion) posture of the government regarding the implementation of programmatic policies contained in the constitution. It is in this scenario that the great objective of this research emerges, which is to demonstrate, quantitatively, how the dynamics of the use of these instruments by political actors occurs and how the Supreme Federal Court (STF) reacted to such provocations: whether from activism or self-restraint. The big question that is sought to answer, with the analysis, is if the filing of actions of control of the omission constitutes a useful mechanism for the political actor in the search for optimum results. In a second step, the research proposes to disentangle the themes that, when judicialized, were recognized as declared omitted by the Supreme Court and, with this, to objectively map these subjects. The results suggested that the use of the omission control instrument does not prove to be a great tactic when considering only the final position of the Supreme Federal Court in its final decisions, which, self-contained, awaits action from the other powers, defendants in these actions, regarding the solution for the judicialized issue. Regarding the mapping of omissions, it was found that the vast majority of issues brought before the courts due to the lack of practical regulation of the elected powers concerned issues that significantly impacted the public budget, considered sensitive issues and, therefore, that could contribute to the Court's self-restraint stance on this type of judgment.