A atuação contramajoritária do Supremo Tribunal Federal: Uma análise empírica sobre o viés político da corte.

Abstract

This research proposes a review of the classic study by Robert A. Dahl on democratic legitimacy, political action and countermajority duty by the US Supreme Court, “Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker”, applied to the Brazilian Constitutional Court (Federal* Court of Justice). The database is broader than the original study, as it considers all declaratory actions of unconstitutionality brought since the democratic* opening. The importance of this research is mainly due to the need for a detailed* empirical analysis of the performance of the Supreme Federal Court in the Brazilian institutional design, following a methodology similar to that used in a well-established study, which adopts both a qualitative and quantitative filter. From the study, it was obtained as preliminary results that the performance of the Supreme Federal Court: is prone to not deviate from the current political coalition; it is less successful in containing legislative majorities on priority political issues and more successful in the face of "weak majorities"; acts more quickly and effectively in government cases critical to the prevailing majority coalition. Finally, it is clear that the activity of the Supreme Court is predominantly concerned with matters related to administrative law and bureaucracy, in general, in line with the coalition in force, above all, through self-containment policies.