Aplicação de conceitos da teoria de jogos para análise de conflitos em recursos hídricos no Eixo Leste do Projeto de Integração do Rio São Francisco.

Abstract

The São Francisco Integration Project (PISF) is the largest water project in the country and aims to ensure water security for 12 million people in 390 in the five states of northeastern Brazil. In Paraíba, a transposition to the Paraíba river from the east axis, perpetuating the river. Arriving at the Poções reservoir, in Monteiro, the water flow through the river, passing through the Camalau reservoir and reaching the Epitácio Pessoa reservoir, in Boqueirão. In order to prevent the collapse in the supply of the city of Campina Grande, interventions were made at the reservoir of Poções and Camalaú, in Monteiro, so that water could reach the Epitácio Pessoa reservoir, in Boqueirão, more quickly. However, such interventions directly affected the population dependent on damaged reservoirs, as they were prevented from accumulating water. Thus, a conflict was established between the population living upstream of the Epitácio Pessoa reservoir and the population benefiting from these interventions (population of Campina Grande and region). The need to guarantee water for the city of Campina Grande was also decisive for the creation of ANA/AESA Resolution nº 1.292 / 2017, which established special conditions for the use of surface and underground water resources of the Rio ParaíbaBoqueirão Water System. This resolution caused great discontent among people imported from the PISF region for irrigation as it restricted the use of PISF waters for irrigation, impacting the lives of those who depended on the resource to irrigate their plantations and ensure their sustenance. These issues resulted in the conflict between the upper Paraíba agricultural producers and the public agencies involved (ANA, AESA, the Paraíba Public Ministry and the State Government of Paraíba). For the analysis of possible solutions to this conflict, concepts derived from the Theory of Games were used, which provided alternative solutions depending on the players involved and the interests of each one. In the simulated scenario, the adoption of measures to support impaired producers, through the technical training of irrigators for the use of watersaving technologies or through a subsidy policy for producers dependent on family agriculture, was indicated as equilibrium of conflict.