O problema da justiça para a teoria pura do direito.

Abstract

Starting from the observance of the analytical and comprehensive constitutional model of the Magna Carta of 1988 and the latency of conflicts between the governing powers in this Democratic State of Law, there is an urgent need to distinguish Law and Politics. This is not a new discussion, for a long time the validity of law, originally in natural law doctrines, was associated with justice, which is commonly corresponding to the prevailing moral sense, as well as a series of active political factors. However, the juspositivist philosopher Hans Kelsen formulated his Pure Theory of Law based on an evaluative doctrine of Law, in which any forms of methodological syncretism would not enter. Thus, starting from the deductive method, that is, explaining the premises in a descending chain of reasoning, as well as using the bibliographic review as a research technique and based, above all, on Kelsen's works, as well as on theorists who studied it, the present research had as general objective to investigate the problem of justice for the pure theory of law. In order to do so, the specific objectives was to analyze the foundations of the juspositivist strand and, in this way, of the Pure Theory of Law, as well as to present the distinction between law and nature and law and morality and, finally, the Kelsen's view of the most widespread notions of justice throughout history, where it was possible to reach the conclusion that they were empty of content. In this way, the study achieved the desired objectives by proving that the interference of values such as justice in law interferes with its technical-scientific character and blocks autonomy by a methodological issue, as it was possible to analyze. But, above all, due to the fact that aligning the validity of the right to correspondence to a certain norm of justice makes the right, in reality, have no validity at all.