FERREIRA, F. J. I.; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5710353889155848; FERREIRA, Francisco Jeferson Inácio.
Abstract:
The present research analyzes the behavior of Brazilian federal deputies in regarding to rollcall
votes. Based on the perspective of neo-institutionalism, we seek to observe which factors
affects the position and the voting of deputies. First, an analytical survey was carried out on
which North American theories exert explanatory mechanisms in the Brazilian decision-making
process. The research addressed the studies about the US Congress as a reference, but also
brings original studies and perspectives on the operation of Congress and the relation between
powers in Brazil. The research starts from the following question: do subnational incentives
affect the behavior of federal deputies, causing them to tend, in the presence of opposing
incentives, to vote less according to the indication of the federal government? The analysis
takes roll-call voting from federal deputies during the period from 2015 to 2019, corresponding
to the 55th legislature and the first year of the 56th. The universe analyzed considers the
presidential coalition and the party of the governor of the state of origin of the parliamentarian,
in order to test the extent to which factors such as the influence of the governor affect the
congruence between the parliamentarian's vote and the federal government's nomination. In
addition, other factors such as the incumbent president at the time of voting, electoral
performance, urbanization and the HDI of the federal deputies' home state were taken into
account. Having these topics established, the description of the data under various criteria, as
well as statistical tests were performed, notably, binary logistic regression, leading to the
conclusion that the fact that the party of the governor of the state of origin of the congressperson
is or is not part of the presidential coalition affects how congruent the parliamentarian is in his
vote in relation to the federal government.
