ALVES, R. R. G.; http://lattes.cnpq.br/2551621547598015; ALVES, Rhávila Rachel Guedes.
Abstract:
The research analyzes the independent variable popularity of the Federal Executive Chief and the impact on the dependent variables performance of the edition of Provisional Measures and their respective conversion into law by the National Congress. In this sense, the study assumes the following question: to what extent does
the president's popularity affect the issue of provisional measures and their respective
conversion into law by the National Congress? The dataset of monthly measures on
presidential popularity produced by the following institutes was used: Datafolha1,
IBOPE2, Ipsos3, Poderdata4 and Sensus5; as well as data from the legislative process
regarding the edition and conversion into law of Provisional Measures organized by the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (Cebrap6). It is a descriptive analysis using time series and inferential statistics. The temporal cut of the data comprises the interval, March 1990 (when the first presidential term by direct elections after the redemocratization of Brazil) and December 2020. The period corresponds to the terms
of the Presidents Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff, Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. The findings
corroborate with most of the literature in political science states: presidential success
in the legislative agenda is explained by factors endogenous to the organizational model of the decision-making process and the facilities for articulation with the
parliamentary base. The incentives of the electoral arena do not lead to actions that impact the way in which the constitutional prerogatives of presidents, typical of
Brazilian presidentialism, are used. The data indicate that the course of parliamentary
actions in relation to presidential acts is not impacted by public opinion about the
government, but by how much each party can earn to vote in favor of the President.
