O standard para além da dúvida razoável no processo penal brasileiro e a subjetividade probatória do aplicador.

Abstract

The main aim of this work is to analyze the apparent exacerbated subjectivity and unbridled power of magistrates when it comes to evaluating evidence, specifically in criminal proceedings, considering all the legal guarantees pertaining to this, especially the presumption of innocence and all its consequences. With regard to the specific objectives, this monograph aims to identify a minimally acceptable normative-practical link regarding the use of reasonable doubt in the Brazilian legal system; to verify the standard beyond reasonable doubt in relation to its peers; and to consider how the judicial decision must be properly substantiated so that there is a supervening control of legality and legitimacy. To this end, the inductive method will be used, continuing with the technique of bibliographical and documentary research, characterizing it as exploratory, employing the historical and comparative methods. After due consideration has been given to the Brazilian legal framework, with the delimitation of the accusatory procedural system, a strong procedural guarantee, as well as the application of the principle of the presumption of innocence and the attempt to reach the truth of the facts, even if it is totally impossible, allied to the notions of the theory of evidence, with the valuation of evidence as a central element of the analysis, through the application of standards of proof, in line with the science of decision making and the magistrate's legal duty to give reasons for decisions, it was considered, at the end of this research, that the problem is extremely relevant to the purposes of jurisdiction, and that there should be a more intense debate among jurists, seeking to avoid judicial errors and effectively exercising and applying justice, in strict compliance with the legality and legitimacy conferred by the original constituent, and to demonstrate that the delimitation of procedural truth is not left to the discretion of the magistrate, who cannot undertake the mission of exercising his office using his personal impressions or intuition, but only based on the whole body of evidence produced under the sieve of the adversarial process, under penalty of real legal insecurity.