Emendas impositivas e a produção Legislativa do Governo Federal no Brasil.

Abstract

This study examines the effects of the implementation of mandatory budget amendments on the dynamics of coalition presidentialism in Brazil, with a focus on the Federal Government’s legislative production in the Chamber of Deputies. To this end, it compares the periods 2012-2015 and 2016-2019, investigating how changes in budgetary rules—introduced by the Mandatory Budget Amendment Proposal (PEC) (2015) and Constitutional Amendment No. 100 (2019)—redefined the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative branches. The research is guided by the following question: How did the success rate of the federal government’s legislative production change before and after the implementation of mandatory budget amendments, considering the Legislative’s agenda-setting power? Adopting a descriptive approach, the study analyzes legislative proposals from both the Executive and the Legislative, as well as parliamentary voting patterns, to identify variations and trends in the decision-making process. The findings indicate a shift toward greater legislative autonomy, reflected in changes in voting patterns and a weakening of the Executive’s capacity to approve its legislative proposals.