A alocação de emendas individuais ao orçamento dos deputados estaduais da Paraíba e Minas Gerais e sua conexão eleitoral.

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between the electoral performance of state deputies and the presentation of individual amendments to the budget in the states of Minas Gerais and Paraíba in the last two legislatures. In this perspective, maps constructed were used to overlap in layers amendments and votes’ percentage of each deputy, in order to verify how the amendments’ allocation of each one was made in contrast to their voting pattern. Therefore, it was possible to summarize three different types of parliamentary behavior: the deputy allocates budget resources in his electoral strongholds; allocates resources in his strongholds, but also seeks to place them in other locations in search of new supporters; there is no relationship between resource allocation, which is scattered by the district, and deputy voting. Then, through statistical tests, it was initially checked whether the spatial distribution of a deputy's votes influences the allocation of individual amendments to the budget. These data refer to the 2010 and 2014 elections, and with respect to the amendments, to the legislatures that follow these. Finally, we sought to measure whether the allocation of amendments in the municipalities is capable of positively influencing the electoral success of candidates in the elections following their presentation. We found in the study that is a weak correlation between amendments and votes for the two states, but this should not absolutely refute the distributivist component of the Brazilian political system because there is a multifaceted electoral connection in the country, with the issuance of partisan and distributive incentives.