Federalismo fiscal: uma análise da descentralização financeira no Brasil e na Argentina.

Abstract

Fiscal federalism concerns the allocation of taxing powers and public revenues among different levels of government, directly affecting the financial autonomy of subnational entities and their capacity to finance public policies. In federations marked by regional inequalities and a high degree of revenue centralization, such as Brazil and Argentina, the institutional design of revenuesharing arrangements and intergovernmental transfers plays a decisive role in shaping federal relations. Within this context, this study aims to comparatively analyze fiscal federalism in Brazil and Argentina, with emphasis on the financial autonomy of subnational governments. The research adopts a descriptive and comparative methodology with a mixed approach, based on documentary and bibliographic analysis of official fiscal data on tax revenue, participation in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and intergovernmental transfers from 2020 to 2024. The results indicate that, although both countries exhibit strong concentration of revenue at the

federal level, Brazil shows greater subnational revenue capacity, supported by significant own- source taxes and a more balanced system of transfers. In Argentina, the institutional

arrangement reveals higher fiscal centralization and strong dependence of provinces and municipalities on national transfers. The conclusions indicate that Brazilian fiscal federalism provides greater subnational financial autonomy, whereas the Argentine model limits fiscal decentralization and reinforces vertical fiscal asymmetry.