Entre barganhas e coalizões: a lógica da formação da base governista no presidencialismo brasileiro.

Abstract

This research investigates how the formation of party coalitions by the Brazilian federal government occurs, considering the political negotiations between the Executive and the Legislative branches within the context of coalition presidentialism. Given the scarcity of studies that combine empirical and theoretical approaches to understand the factors influencing party adherence to governing coalitions, the study analyzes the strategies employed by presidents to build and maintain a parliamentary majority. Adopting a qualitative and descriptive approach, the investigation covers the period from 2011 to 2024 and combines a literature review with questionnaires applied to members of Congress and their advisors, as well as the analysis of 150 news articles. The results confirm that the allocation of strategic positions and budgetary resources are the main incentives for party participation in coalitions, often outweighing ideological alignment. Among the 18 respondents, 15 considered the distribution of positions and resources effective in maintaining the governing base, while only 2 judged it ineffective. Furthermore, 14 stated that such benefits strongly influence parliamentary decision-making. Although Constitutional Amendment No. 86/2015 reduced the use of budget amendments as bargaining tools, the Executive still controls the timing of resource disbursement. However, this control does not prevent perceptions of a shift in bargaining dynamics, as 10 respondents acknowledged a weakening of the Executive’s bargaining power due to the mandatory execution of parliamentary amendments. The analysis highlights the transactional nature of inter-branch relations, reinforcing the centrality of political exchange in governance. The main contribution lies in offering an empirically grounded interpretation of the political mechanisms underpinning coalition presidentialism in Brazil.