Emendas impositivas e sua relação com a competição eleitoral.

Abstract

This study investigated the impact of the increasing use of mandatory individual amendments on the level of electoral competition in elections for Federal Deputies in Brazil, covering the 2014, 2018, and 2022 elections. The central objective was to analyze whether the increase in the volume of resources under the direct control of parliamentarians contributed to the change in the probability of success of incumbents versus challengers. The methodology employed is quantitative in nature, using electoral and budgetary data, with the application of Multivariate Linear Regression and Logistic Regression models to isolate the effect of the variables. The results demonstrate a marked structural transformation in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, with the success rate of challengers falling by half in the analyzed period (from 5.7% to 2.5%). Econometric models reveal that incumbency is the strongest and most statistically significant predictor of electoral success, giving the incumbent a 53 times greater chance of victory in 2022. Interestingly, the Committed Amendments variable lost statistical significance in the 2022 election, suggesting that the resource is not the direct cause of victory, but rather a strategic institutional resource. This interpretation is reinforced by the strong correlation (r = 0.844) between the volume of amendments per capita and the greater electoral vulnerability of the incumbent, indicating the tactical use of the resource to consolidate support bases. The conclusion is that the mandatory budget indirectly contributed to the crystallization of incumbency, raising the barrier to entry and decreasing electoral competition. The amendment resource acts as a lubricant for the reelection machine, enhancing the institutional advantage of the mandate and weakening democratic accountability.