A violência político-eleitoral e a interferência das facções criminosas nas eleições subnacionais da Paraíba.

Abstract

This dissertation proposes an introductory investigation into the role and interference of criminal organizations in electoral processes, with emphasis on the impacts of these practices on accountability — particularly vertical accountability — and on the quality of democracy. The empirical focus of the study is the subnational elections held in the state of Paraíba, Brazil, in 2016, 2020, and 2024. The theoretical framework is primarily grounded in the contributions of Robert Dahl and Guillermo O’Donnell, especially regarding the criteria for characterizing polyarchies and the bidimensional concept of accountability, articulated alongside discussions in the specialized literature on political and electoral violence. From a methodological standpoint, the research adopts a documentary and exploratory design, combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, with a primary focus on the political context of Paraíba. The analysis begins with a broad literature review on armed interventions in electoral processes in Latin America, with particular attention to the Brazilian case, for which a historical perspective is constructed at both national and regional levels. Considering the adopted empirical scope, the study seeks to answer whether the mobilization of federal security forces to Paraíba during subnational elections stems from the interference of criminal factions and how such interference manifests itself. To this end, a documentary examination is conducted of administrative proceedings available in the Electronic Judicial Process system (PJe), related to the deployment of federal troops in municipal elections. The findings indicate that, in the 2016 elections, although federal troops were deployed to certain municipalities in Paraíba, the Electoral Justice did not explicitly recognize the involvement of criminal organizations as the basis for its decisions, even though indications of their influence were present. In contrast, in the 2024 elections, there was formal recognition of the direct interference of criminal organizations, evidenced by practices such as voter coercion, territorial control, and the intimidation of candidates. In 2020, however, unlike the other years analyzed, there was neither the mobilization of federal forces to the state nor official records indicating the presence of criminal cells in the electoral process. Based on the set of analyses developed, the study concludes that the institutionalization of political-electoral violence undermines voters’ freedom of choice and weakens mechanisms of democratic accountability, producing negative effects both on the integrity of the electoral process and on the capacity for interinstitutional oversight, and, consequently, on the overall quality of the democratic regime.